

A

# REVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE BRITISH NATION.

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Thursday, August 28. 1707.

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THEY that thought I did not expect all that Raillery, Rage, and the Fury of Madmen could produce, when I enter'd upon the Enquiry into the weak Places of the Confederacy, and examin'd where the French had too much opportunity to hurt us, by way of Equivalent for Thoulon, must think me more ignorant, both of the Malice as well as Temper of my Enemies, than I have Reason to be.

I have been every bodies Agent they could think of here, and now I am the French Kings Agent; whose Service I shall enter into next, I cannot imagine.

I am the French Kings Agent, because I would have him be beaten into Peace, and now am his Agent, because I am searching where the Politicks of the Enemy may serve themselves of our weakness and negligence, and find out Equivalents to our Conquests.

Unhappy Malice! That blinds the Eyes of its Authors, to expose themselves to such Absurdities as these— Either I have told these Truths before the Enemy found them out, or since they found 'em out—

If before they found them out, it cannot be ill done to give Notice, that they might be prevented; if since they found them out, then it was fairly giving the Alarm to our Friends, in order to awaken them; O but it is leading the Enemy into the Methods how to ruine us; Ridiculous! — Where is this done? — Was it in Portugal? And did not all our Accounts tell us, long before this, that the Duke of Orleans was sending 10 Battalions from Arragon, and 6000 Men from Navarre to joyn the Marquis De Bay, on the Frontiers of Portugal, and that Portugal was to be Pres'd with 4 or 5 several Bodies of Men all at once? Pray,

Pray, Gentlemen, do not hook a poor Author into a Plot ; upon my Word, I had no hand in the March of those Troops ; I only cry'd Fire when I saw the Flame ; Ah foolish Nation ! Do the French want us to show them their Advantages ?

Is it in *Bavaria* ? Alas poor *REVIEW* ! Was I in the Plot discover'd at *Ausburgh*, or did I direct Monsieur *Villars* to send Officers into *Bavaria* ? Indeed so.

Is it in the *Emperor's Affair* ? — Sure, I have not Interest with the *Swedes*, to push them upon seeking occasions against the *Emperor*, first sending Officers into his Territories to raise Soldiers to be employ'd, perhaps against their Master, and then demand Satisfaction for his Officers resisting them ; and if I had, I think 'tis too unjust to encourage it —

What is it then, Gentlemen, that this *Review* has done ! — I'll tell you what he has done — He has told you, what, whoever had Eyes to look round him, might have seen before ; He has told you not what the Enemy may do — But what they then were, and still are actually doing ; if this be to be Vile, I shall still be more Vile ; I think it the Duty of every Man that speaks in Publick, to speak that which is both true and serviceable — I have cry'd Fire, after it was kindled, tho' before it was broke out ; let them that think I rais'd the Alarm too soon, look a little farther, and they will find 'twas far from being too soon : I pray GOD it be not too late !

If I am wrong, if *Portugal* is in no Danger, if the French are not drawing about her, and if she be not in a Naked-Defenceless Posture, Comparatively speaking ; why is Her Majesty sending Forces thither to support them ? And why are the Troops, which Landed there from *Ireland* to be sent to King *Charles*, detain'd there to encourage them, till others shall arrive ? — *Portugal* is too sweet a Morsel to let slip, and the Enemy too Vigilant not to be Tempted with it ; from the Day of the Victory at *Almanza*, they have had their Hearts intent upon it, and their Forces are Marching on all sides to it.

I say, again, it will be a Melancholy Equivalent for *Toulon*, if it should be forc'd either into the Enemies Hands, or by a Neutrality out of ours.

I contemn to the last degree, the Absurdity and Malice of those, that pretend to raise a Clamour at me, as serving the Enemy in this ; I am sure the Enemy are not of that Opinion — Let it quicken our Zeal to disappoint them ; let it hasten our Preparations ; let it encourage us to back and support the King of *Portugal*, to keep him steady in the Interest of the Allies.

Time was, a certain Prince in the World was oblig'd to abandon the Confederacy, for want of suitable and Seasonable Supplies : We have had great Reason to believe the King of *Portugal* is hearty in the Interest of the Confederacy — But the King of *Portugal's* Circumstances differ exceedingly, from what they were before the Battle of *Almanza* ; and 'tis no Reproach upon him to say, he is not in a Condition to Repulse the French and Spanish Power now United and Victorious ; he is cut off from that part of his Army which was join'd with the Confederates, and the best of his Troops were Ruin'd at *Almanza*, and is thereby much weaken'd at Home.

The End of the Story, and the true meaning of this Author, is to quicken our Thoughts, and open our Eyes to the necessity of relieving him, and of sending great Supplies to him, and that speedily.

And shall I tell you another Reason also ? I suppose I am not the only Man that has heard People quarrel with their Superiors, that Recruits are sending, and Regiments Shipping to *Portugal*, and not to King *Charles* : Much Railing I have heard on this Head indeed — Now tho' some People will rail at every thing, yet I think it is not unnecessary to let such people know, that there is really more necessity to send assistance to the King of *Portugal*, than to the King of *Spain*, and that even from the Effects of the Battle of *Almanza*.

And I believe this necessity is so visible to the Government, that what can be spar'd will immediately be appointed to that purpose ; and as for King *Charles*, we have some Reason to hope he will be relief'd some other way.

And now Impartial Readers will see clearly, the meaning of my equivalent for *Toulon* ; for the rest let Shimci Curse, let Railers

legs Rail, and cast their filth about, 'tis worth no honest Man's notice.

I question not but I am to be ruffled also for givieg my Opinion, that the Town of *Toulon* will not be taken without Blows, and this is call'd magnifying the French— Those that cannot see, that to Villify and undervalue the Enemy, and then not immediately trample them under Foot, is to Villify and undervalue our own Army and Friends ; I say those that cannot discern this, I am sorry for their Heads.

It is for the Honour of Prince *Eugene*, 'tis for the Reputation of the German Army, and the best sort of Panegyrick which can be made upon them, to set the Forces of their Enemies in a true Light, give a full and fair Description of their real Preparations for Resistance first, and then expect their Victory with the same hope as before. The Glory of the Duke of *Lorrain* at the Taking of *Buds*, of King *William* at *Namure*, and of the Duke of *Marlborough* at the Battle of *Blenheim* ; whence did their extraordinary Trophies rise ? But from the Fury, Resistance, and Reputation of the Enemy. Had Count *Tallard* Commanded an Army of *Muscovites*, or had *Buds* and *Namure* been Garrison'd with Burghers and Militia ; we had never seen the World Glorying in those Conquests, as part of the Wonders of their Times.

If the French are all Scoundrels and Puff-trous, if they have neither Conduct nor Courage, if they are meer old Women, and to be treated with such Contempt ; 'tis a Satyr upon Prince *Eugene*, that he has not stord'm them Sword in Hand, and wrote *vidi, vici*, upon the Gates by this time ; nay, 'tis a Satyr upon his Prudence, for making such vafy Preparations, calling in such assistance as the Fleet, &c. and his drawing all the Forces of the Confederates together, to such an easy Conquest.

But he knows better things ; 'tis one thing to make right Judgments, and take a clear View of our Enemis strength ; and 'tis another thing to be terrify'd at them. When I say, the French are not to be frightened out of strong Towns with Great Words, that they will Fight and dispute their Ground by Inches, it should be far from

from frightening us with their Power ; but these are the uses I desire may be made of it.

1. To rouse us up, and open our Eyes to the necessity of Vigorous and Diligent Preparations against them ; 'tis far from a Reason for weakening our Hands, to describe the Strength of our Enemy, 'tis to quicken our Preparations ; if any make a faint-hearted use of it, that is their fault, not mine.
2. To quiet those People, who are so impatient of the Success of every Enterprize, who, if it be not Immediately done, hit off hand, and carried without Interruption, are crying out in Despair, that it cannot be done at all.

Those therefore that from their Contempt of the Enemy, fill Peoples heads with expectation of every great Undertaking being immediately brought to pass ; I say, they are Enemies to the ease of the Peoples Minds, and betray their Country into Disappointments and Discontents, and perhaps that may be one Design of it.

To prevent these things, 'tis my way to set things as near as I can in a true Light, and not let Peoples Minds be p.iss'd with Expectations of Miracles and Surprizing Conquests every Day ; which when they find not following their Schemes, and that Armies do not fly as fast as Whymies lead ; then railing at Delays, Reproaching the Diligence, and perhaps the Faithfulness of Persons, yea, of Nations, follow.

For this Reason, Gentlemen, I say, have Patience, *TOULON* may fall, what can be done will be done ; 'tis a cheap Conquest, if it be obtain'd in three times the Days that our Wagermen have allotted for it ; it must be Fought for, expect it ; and 'tis a great Point, that it may be had for Fighting for— This Devil, as I said before, is not to be exorcis'd by Songs and Circles ; if he be cast out, it must be by Force and Fighting, and I make no question but the Confederates expect it.

But we that stay at Home take Towns immediateiy, we can draw Lines of Circumvallation, and Contravallation ; open Trenches,